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Abstract—The training of deep neural network classifiers
results in decision boundaries which geometry is still not well
understood. This is in direct relation with classification problems
such as so called adversarial examples. We introduce zoNNscan,
an index that is intended to inform on the boundary uncertainty
(in terms of the presence of other classes) around one given input
datapoint. It is based on confidence entropy, and is implemented
through sampling in the multidimensional ball surrounding that
input. We detail the zoNNscan index, give an algorithm for
approximating it, and finally illustrate its benefits on four applica-
tions, including two important problems for the adoption of deep
networks in critical systems: adversarial examples and corner
case inputs. We highlight that zoNNscan exhibits significantly
higher values than for standard inputs in those two problem
classes.
Index Terms—Decision boundaries, classification uncertainty,
entropy, Monte Carlo sampling.
I. INTRODUCTION
Measures are important tools in all computer science do-
mains, as far as they allow to quantify and then analyze
specific problems [1], or to serve as a building block for
designing better algorithms [2]. In the blooming field of
machine learning leveraging deep neural networks, open prob-
lems remain that are related to the emergence of decision
boundaries in classification tasks. Little is known about the
geometrical properties of those [3]. Yet, the relation between
the position of those boundaries, with respect to classification
of individual input datapoints at inference time, is getting more
salient with the increasing amount critical applications that are
using deep neural networks. The case of self-driving cars is an
illustration of a critical application, where corner-cases have
been recently found in production models (leading to wrong
decisions) [4]; the input that causes the erroneous classification
are depicted to be close from decision boundaries. Another
example class of problems is known as adversarial examples
[5], where inputs are slightly modified in order to cause the
target model to misclassify them. The modified inputs are also
close to the boundary of their original classes, as humans
barely see the modification of those inputs. In addition, there
are also recent works that are voluntarily tweaking the decision
boundaries around given inputs, so that ownership information
can be embedded into a target model [6].
While measures are inherently in use with neural networks
to evaluate the quality of the learning task over a given dataset,
we find that there is a lack of an index that provides informa-
tion on the neighboring of given inputs, with regards to the
boundaries of other classes. Visual inspections of suspicious
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Fig. 1. An illustration of zoNNscan runs around two inputs. The example on
the left (a 6 digit) is far from the model decision boundary, thus a zoNNscan
at radius r returns a value close to 0. The example on the right is an adversarial
example (causing the 6 digit to be misclassified as a 0), that is by definition
close to the decision boundary of its original class; zoNNscan returns a
higher value (up to 1), as some data samples in the ball fall into the original
digit class.
zones, by plotting in 2D a given decision boundary and the
considered inputs is possible [7]. In this paper, we propose
an algorithm to output an index, for it helps to automatically
identify problems at inference time.
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows. Section
II introduces the zoNNscan index, as well as a Monte
Carlo approximation of it. The use of zoNNscan is then
demonstrated 1 in Section III, on four different scenarios.
We review related works and conclude in Sections IV and V.
II. ZONING CLASSIFICATION UNCERTAINTY
Classically, given an input and a trained model, the class
predicted by the classifier is set to be the one with the higher
score in the output vector [9]. These scores can thus be consid-
ered as membership probabilities to the model classes: output
values close to 1 are to be interpreted as a high confidence
about the prediction, and conversely, values close to 0 show
high probabilities of non membership to the corresponding
class. These scores also provide the information about the
uncertainty of the model for a given input : vector scores close
to each other indicate an uncertainty between these classes,
and equal scores characterize a decision boundary point [10].
Thereby, a maximum uncertainty output refers to an input that
causes inference to return an uniform vector of probabilities 1C
for a classification task into C-classes. Conversely, minimum
uncertainty corresponds to an input that causes inference to
return a vector of zeros, except for the predicted class for
which a one is set. zoNNscan evaluates the uncertainty of
predictions in a given input region. This is illustrated on Figure
1: the digit on the left is surrounded by no decision boundary
in a ball of radius r around it. The digit on the right is an
1The implementation of zoNNscan is open-sourced on GitHub [8].
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2adversarial example crafted from the previous digit; it is now
classified as a 0, and a zoNNscan in a ball of the same
radius indicates the presence of boundary and then a possibly
problematic input with higher zoNNscan value.
A. zoNNscan: definition
Given a discrete probability distribution p = {p1, ..., pC} ∈
[0, 1]C with ΣCi=1pi = 1 (C designates the number of events),
we remind the definition of the Shannon entropy (b designates
the base for the logarithm) :
Hb : [0, 1]
C → R+
p 7→ ΣCi=1(−pi logb(pi)).
The maximum of Hb is reached in p = { 1C , ..., 1C } and
is equal to logb(C) and with the convention 0 logb(0) = 0,
the minimum of Hb is 0. Subsequently, we use a C-based
logarithm to make HC output values in range [0, 1]. A clas-
sifier M is considered as a function defined on the input
space [0, 1]d (on the premise that data are generally normalized
for the training phase in such a way that all features are
included in the range [0, 1]), taking its values in the space
P = {p ∈ [0, 1]C s.t. ΣCi=1pi = 1}. We introduce the
composite function ϕ = Hb ◦M to model the indecision the
network has on the input space. More specifically, we propose
the expectation of ϕ(U), EZ[ϕ(U)] (with U a uniform random
variable on Z), on an input zone Z ∈ [0, 1]d, to be an indicator
on the uncertainty of the classifier on zone Z.
Definition 1: Let the zoNNscan index be, in zone Z:
B([0, 1]d) → [0, 1]
Z 7→ EZ[ϕ(U)] =
∫
Z
ϕ(u)fU (u) du,
where B(Rd) refers to the Rd Borel set and fU the uniform
density on Z.
The minima of EZ[ϕ(U)] depicts observations in Z that
were all returning one confidence of 1, and C−1 confidences
of 0. Conversely, the maxima indicates full uncertainty, where
each observation returned 1C confidence values in the output
vector.
B. A Monte Carlo approximation of zoNNscan
In practice, as data are typically nowadays of high dimen-
sionality (e.g., in the order of millions of dimensions for image
applications) and deep neural networks are computing complex
non-linear functions, one cannot expect to compute the exact
value of this expectation. We propose a Monte Carlo method
to estimate this expectation on a space corresponding to the
surrounding zone of a certain input.
For inspection around a given input X ∈ [0, 1]d, we consider
a ball B of center X and radius r, as zone Z introduced in
previous subsection. We perform a Monte Carlo sampling of
k inputs in a ball for the infinite-norm, corresponding to the
hyper-cube of dimension d, around X (as depicted on Figure
1). We are generating inputs applying random deformations2
i on each components Xi such as max(−Xi,−r) ≤ i ≤
min(1−Xi, r).
2For more advanced sampling techniques in high dimensional spaces, please
refer to e.g., [11].
Algorithm 1 Monte Carlo approximation of zoNNscan
Require: M, X, r, k
for i = 0..k do
x′ ← Monte Carlo Sampling in B∞(X, r) ∩ [0, 1]d
Pi ←M(x′) {Inference}
entropyi ← HC(Pi)
end for
return 1k
k∑
i=1
entropyi
For instance, given a normalized input X and a positive
radius r, Monte Carlo sampling is performed uniformly in the
subspace of Rd defined as:
Z = B∞(X, r) ∩ [0, 1]d.
The larger the number of samples k, the better the approx-
imation of the index; this value has to be set considering the
application and the acceptable computation/time constraints
for inspection.
The zoNNscan index, for inspection of the surrounding of
input X in a model M, is presented on Algorithm 1.
III. ILLUSTRATION USE OF ZONNSCAN
We first give an example of zoNNscan use for the analysis
of the surrounding regions of four inputs from the MNIST and
CIFAR-10 datasets, in subsection III-A, using the multi-layer
perceptron (noted MLP hereafter) proposed as an example in
the Keras library [12]. We then give two illustrations of the
capacity of zoNNscan to identify problematic zones around
inputs, in III-B and III-C. We conclude this section in III-D
by considering the impact of a novel watermarking technique
on boundaries. In the sequel, if not mentioned, Algorithm 1
is run with k = 10, 000 samples.
A. Uncertainty around a given input
A first zoNNscan use case is to assess at which distance
and in which proportions are other classes surrounding an
interesting input X .
Figure 2 presents the zoNNscan values with respect vari-
ous radii r, around two input examples. A radius value r = 0
is equivalent to the simple output vector corresponding to
the inference of X , i.e., without actual sampling in B. Our
algorithm starts with a r = 0, up to 13. For top-experiment,
the confidence value for r = 0 is high for digit 6 (around
0.9), which is reflected by zoNNscan value to be low (around
0.2). When r increases, the confidence values of other classes
are increasing progressively, which results for zoNNscan to
increase sharply; at radii of r = [0.25, 1] uncertainty in such
a ball is critical.
Adversarial examples were proposed by [5], as attacks
against a model: a small perturbation of an input example
causes a misclassification by that model. Some of those attacks
are close to invisible to humans [13]; this makes the use of
3Note that for X ∈ [0, 1]d and for r ≥ 1, B∞(X, r) ∩ [0, 1]d = [0, 1]d,
then the space of normalized data is totally covered by the sampling process.
3radius r radius r
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Fig. 2. zoNNscan values (dotted black line) on y-axes, with a varying radius r ∈ [0, 1] on x-axes. Mean confidence scores for each class in the explored
zone are also reported (colored lines). (a) MNIST dataset: Top Figure: a 6 digit classified by the MLP model. Bottom Figure: a adversarial example classified
as a 0. (b) CIFAR-10 dataset: Top Figure: a ship classified by RESNETv2. Bottom Figure: an adversarial example classified as a cat.
an index particularly interesting for detection. The bottom
experiment on Figure 2 (a) inspects an adversarial example
created from the previous digit (we used the fast gradient
method from [5], with a  = 0.2). We remark that at r = 0,
zoNNscan is high, and remains as such with increasing r. We
perform the same experiment on one image from the CIFAR-
10 dataset (a ship), and on an adversarial example (classified as
a cat, with  = 0.008) on Bottom Figure 2 (b): the zoNNscan
value is twice higher for the adversarial example than for
the standard input. This exhibits that zoNNscan consistently
captures the uncertainty related to the close boundary location
for the adversarial examples, and then may allow to identify
certain inputs as a problematic one at inference time.
This experiment brings two other observations: (i) the study
of the evolution of zoNNscan values with growing radii is of
interest to characterize surrounding or problematic zones (see
sharp variations on Figure 2). (ii) for a r covering the whole
input space, we obtain an estimate of the surface occupied by
each class in the model (e.g., class 8 dominates on MNIST,
while class ’truck’ is covering most of classification space for
the CIFAR-10 case).
B. The surrounding of adversarial examples
We now question the relevance of zoNNscan in the task of
discriminating adversarial examples from standard (i.e., non-
adversarial) inputs. We add two models for the experiment,
also from Keras [12]: a convolutional neural network (CNN),
and a recurrent neural network (IRNN), and focus on the
MNIST dataset. First, the distribution of zoNNscan values
(estimated in B with r = 0.025) around 500 inputs taken
from the test set, are plotted in blue. Those distributions are
represented for the three neural networks. The experiment
then creates 500 adversarial examples per model with the fast
gradient method, starting from the previous 500 inputs (red
distribution). Figure 3 plots those empirical distributions.
We can observe significant difference in those distributions,
for each model. The mean of those empirical distributions
are reported in Table I (rows in grey). Consistently with the
experiment in subsection III-A, we observe higher values of
zoNNscan around adversarial examples than around standard
inputs.
Fig. 3. Relative distributions of zoNNscan values (x-axes) around 500
random test set examples (blue) and around the 500 adversarial examples
generated from those test set examples (red), for the three networks (MLP,
CNN and IRNN, from left to right, respectively).
In order to formally assess this difference in the two dis-
tributions, we performed the statistical Kolmogorov-Smirnov
2-sample test [14]; it is e.g., available under R. It tests the
null hypothesis that two samples (here of both adversarial and
standard inputs zoNNscan values) were drawn from the same
continuous distribution. In any of the three case (MLP, CNN
and IRNN models), the test rejects the null hypothesis with
p-values lower than 10−3. The p-values of this test correspond
to the probabilities of observing the values under the null
hypothesis. This confirms the distinguishability of the two
distributions, and then the interest of zoNNscan.
C. Disagreement on corner case inputs
Arguably interesting inputs are the ones that make several
deep neural network models disagree, as depicted in the case
4of self-driving cars [4]. Indeed, they constitute corner cases,
that have to be dealt with for most critical applications.
While this problem may be masked using voting techniques
by several independent classifiers [15], we are interested in
studying the zoNNscan value of those particular inputs.
Given two models, those inputs are extracted by comparing
the predictions of the two models on a given dataset. In the
MNIST dataset, we identify a total of 182 disagreements (i.e.,
corner cases) for the three models.
Fig. 4. Relative distributions of zoNNscan around 1, 000 random test set
inputs (blue) and the 182 corner case inputs (red).
We plot on Figure 4 the two following empirical distri-
butions. First, in blue, the distribution of 1, 000 zoNNscan
values around test set inputs; second, in red, the distribution
of the 182 corner case inputs. The zoNNscan index is also
estimated with r = 0.025.
As for previous experiment, we observe a significant dif-
ference in the distributions (means are reported on Table I,
rows in white), yet with a larger overlap. The Kolmogorov-
Smirnov 2-sample test rejects in each case the null hypothesis
with p-values lower than 10−3. This experiment indicates the
likelihood to detect those critical inputs due to their higher
value, while running inference on a single network.
D. Effects of watermarking on model boundaries
As a final illustration, we consider the recent work [6]
consisting in watermarking a model. This operation is per-
formed as follows: first, a watermark key consisting of inputs
is created. Half of the key inputs are actually adversarial
examples. Second, the watermarking step consists in finetuning
the model by retraining it over the key inputs, in order to
re-integrate the adversarial examples in their original class.
That last step is by definition moving the model decision
boundaries, which constitutes the watermark that the model
owner has sought to introduce.
All three models are watermarked with keys of size 100.
Each input of those three keys is used as input X for
zoNNscan, for 100 runs of Algorithm 1 with k = 1, 000
samples each. Two distributions of zoNNscan values are
computed: one for the un-marked model, and another for the
watermarked one.
If the watermarked model were indistinguishable from the
original one, the two distributions would be the same. Once
Scenario MLP CNN IRNN
500 inputs from test set 0.3499 0.3462 0.2399
500 adversarial examples 0.8986 0.9613 0.5254
1,000 inputs from test set 0.3709 0.3457 0.2403
182 corner case inputs 0.6857 0.6564 0.2989
TABLE I
MEAN OF THE EMPIRICAL ZONNSCAN DISTRIBUTIONS, FOR THE THREE
NEURAL NETWORKS. THE GREY ROWS REFER TO EXPERIMENTS IN
SUBSECTION III-B, AND THE WHITE ONES TO III-C.
again, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 2-sample test returns p-values
lower than 10−3. This reflects the fact that boundaries have
changed around the key inputs, at least enough to be observed
by zoNNscan. As the watermarking process is expected to
be as stealthy possible, this highlights that the key is to remain
a secret for the model owner only [6].
IV. RELATED WORKS
While some metrics such as distance-from-boundaries [2]
have been developed for support vector machines for instance,
the difficulty to reason about the classifier decision bound-
aries of neural networks have motivated research works since
decades. Lee et al. [16] proposed the extraction of features
from decision boundaries, followed by [10] that targets the
same operation without assuming underlying probability dis-
tribution functions of the data. An interesting library for visual
inspection of boundaries, from low dimensional embedding
is available online [7]. Fawzi et al. propose to analyze some
geometric properties of deep neural network classifiers [3],
including the curvature of those boundaries. Van den Berg [9]
studies the decision region formation in the specific case of
feedforward neural networks with sigmoidal nonlinearities.
Both Pei et al. [4] and Goodfellow et al. [5] propose to
generate inputs that may induce problems in the tested deep
neural networks. Those are proposing attacks, not indexes.
Cross entropy is one of the most basic measure for the
training of neural networks. While it evaluates the divergence
of the dataset distribution from the model distribution, it is not
applied to inspect the confidence in the inference of specific
zones in the input space. This paper addresses the relation of
the surrounding of a given input with respect to the presence of
decision boundaries of other classes; this relation is captured
by the zoNNscan index, leveraging the Shannon entropy.
V. CONCLUSION
We introduced a novel index, zoNNscan, for inspecting
the surrounding of given inputs with regards to the boundary
entropy measured in the zones of interest. We have presented
a Monte Carlo estimation of that index, and have shown its
applicability on a base case, on a recent technique for model
watermarking, and on two concerns regarding the adoption
of current deep neural networks (adversarial examples and
corner case inputs). As this index is intended to be generic,
we expect other applications to leverage it; future works for
instance include the study of the link of zoNNscan values
with regards to other identified issues such as new trojaning
attacks on neural networks [17].
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